UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SCHOOL
WEAPONS TRAINING BATTALION
TRAINING COMMAND
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STUDENT OUTLINE

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSITANCE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

CAC-PLAN-208

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNER COURSE

M020AQD

NOVEMBER 2015

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. **TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE.** Given a mission, commander's intent, operations order, scenario, and CMO planning products (e.g. CMO staff estimate, CMO COA graphic and narrative, and a sync matrix, etc.), support stability operations planning, to enable the commander's decision making process by identifying instability and stability factors and to design activities to mitigate instability or reinforce stability factors within the operating environment in accordance with MCWP 3-33.1. (CACT-PLAN-2005)

b. **ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES**

(1) Without the aid of references, identify HADR planning activities in accordance with JP 3-29, Ch III. (CACT-PLAN-2005d)

(2) Without the aid of references, identify the categories of assistance in accordance with JP 3-29, Ch III. (CACT-PLAN-2005e)

1. **FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE**

a. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) consists of Department of Defense (DoD) activities conducted outside the United States (U.S.) and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease hunger or privation. These activities are governed by various statutes and policies and range from steady-state engagements to limited contingency operations. FHA includes foreign disaster relief (FDR) operations and other activities that directly address humanitarian need, and may also be conducted concurrently with other DoD support missions such as dislocated civilian support, security operations, and foreign consequence management (FCM).

b. FHA operations (including FDR operations) are normally conducted in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of State (DoS). FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. FHA is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) that has the primary responsibility for providing that assistance; and may support other United States Government (USG) departments or agencies. Although U.S. military forces are organized and equipped to conduct military operations that defend and protect U.S. national interests, their inherent, unique capabilities may be used to conduct FHA activities.

2. **THE OVERARCHING RELIEF PROCESS**. Civil-military operations (CMO) planners must understand the relief process depicted in the diagram below. This model captures the continuous, cyclic nature of the overarching relief process. Critical to this process is information sharing among all the parties. The relief cycle is repeated as needs assessments are updated, requirements refined, additional requests for assistance (RFAs) made, and operations continue. While this model conveys the impression of an orderly process, in reality the process is complex and sometimes fragmented due to the large number of different organizations with their own missions and sometimes competing agendas.



a. **Needs assessments**. HN, USAID, intergovernmental organizations (IGO), nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and USG departments and agencies conduct needs assessments on the extent of the disaster/emergency and the needs/requirements. Needs assessments also include determining the capabilities and resources of various relief organizations, including military, if they are part of the effort.

b. **Needs analysis**. Analysis is an essential component of the relief process. Needs assessments and capabilities are analyzed to update and resolve differences, determine outstanding needs/requirements, and reasonably anticipated future needs. Based on outstanding needs/requirements, the host nation (HN) may request international assistance. NGOs and IGOs may also appeal to the international community and donors for funding and assistance. The military may receive, normally through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), RFAs to provide HA support, subject to the policies of the USG.

c. **Relief/Donor action**. Humanitarian agencies, donors, and foreign military commands provide relief based on their ability to respond to appeals and RFAs. Foreign government, regional organizations, and the UN may make available immediate funds and other resources very early in the relief cycle. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) administers a Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) to provide immediate assistance.

d. **Performance monitoring**. Donors and humanitarian agencies monitor the performance of their programs in the field to measure results and identify gaps or problems. Performance monitoring informs humanitarian policy decisions and the design of future humanitarian programs, while ensuring accountability to taxpayers, donors, and beneficiaries.

3. **UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**. The nature of the operational environment (OE) obviously impacts the conduct of FHA operations. Important elements of the OE the CMO planner should consider during planning and execution of HADR operations include the type of disaster involved (including underlying causes), the prevailing security environment, and the system of international relief at work. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) will assist in developing this understanding and applying it to planning and execution. Should the MAGTF operate as a part of a Combined or Joint Task Force, the process of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) would be applicable.

a. **Types of disasters**. Most disasters have underlying causes that may demand changes in human systems and processes (e.g., tsunami alert systems, better food management, weak or failing HN infrastructure or processes, or even civil war). Normally, forces conducting HADR following a disaster are tasked to focus on the event at hand rather than the underlying causes. However, understanding these causes can enhance mission accomplishment and force protection. Disasters and consequent emergencies may occur suddenly or develop over a period of time. Speed of onset has important consequences for action that can be taken. Prevention, preparedness, and early warning measures are much less developed for rapid onset disasters.

(1) Slow onset. Slow onset emergencies include those resulting from crop failure due to drought, the spread of agricultural pest or disease, or a gradually deteriorating situation leading to conflict.

(2) Rapid onset. Rapid onset emergencies are usually the result of sudden, natural events such as wind storms, hurricanes, typhoons, floods, tsunamis, wildfires, landslides, avalanches, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. They may also be caused by accidental or human-caused catastrophes such as civil conflict, acts of terrorism, sabotage, or industrial accidents.

(3) Complex. An increasing number of emergencies are related to conflict and have come to be known as "complex emergencies." The United Nations (UN) defines a complex emergency as "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program." USAID defines it as "natural or man-made disaster with economic, social, and political dimensions. The result is a profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to man-made and natural disasters, while some others may benefit from it. Four factors can be measured: the fatalities from violence; the mortality of children under five years of age; the percentage of underweight children under five; and the number of external refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)." Common characteristics of a complex emergency include:

(a) Many civilian casualties and populations besieged or displaced.

(b) Serious political or conflict-related impediments to delivery of assistance.

(c) Inability of people to pursue normal social, political, or economic activities.

(d) High security risks for relief workers.

(e) International and cross-border operations affected by diplomatic or political differences.

b. **Relief System**. An assessment of the situation should include a description of the relief organizations (NGOs, IGOs, HN, and private sector), foreign governments and military forces, UN agencies, or any other pertinent element already involved in the FHA effort, what relationship exists among them,

and the effectiveness of the organizations in place. Depending on the type of operation, DoS or USAID will be critical in mapping this system and identifying key players in multiple organizations. The range of civilian actors and programs is often determined by security factors in the OE. For example, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) typically work in permissive environments (following a disaster), while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can operate in uncertain or hostile OEs. The diagram below depicts the definitions of the three FHA



operational environments.

c. **HADR Planning and JIPOE**. During FHA operations it is likely that the MAGTF will be engaged in relief efforts through a Joint Task Force (JTF). JIPOE follows a multistep process to define the OE, describe the effects of the environment, evaluate the enemy, and determine enemy courses of action. JIPOE support during FHA requires a different mindset and techniques than a JIPOE effort to defeat an adversary. The mindset will likely be more collaborative and open to correct false data and improve analysis. This analysis identifies a number of nodes (specific physical, functional, or cultural entities within each system). Nodes can include people; transportation infrastructure; sociological and political structure; economic systems; potential friendly, neutral, and adversary elements; the information environment; and other components of the OE. JIPOE analysts also identify links (the cultural, physical, or functional relationship between nodes.). As with many aspects of crisis action planning (CAP), JIPOE will be continuous

throughout the planning and execution process. Due to the complexity of the JIPOE process during FHA, CMO planners / CA Marines are well placed to assist in ongoing JIPOE analysis much of which will involve matters related to CMO.

d. **Assessment Factors**. Assessment factors that may assist the JIPOE process are found in USAID's *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response,* Sphere Project *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response,* and the Sphere Project *Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards,* UNHCR *Handbook for Emergencies,* and the DoS *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks*. The following are examples of factors that can aid in assessing the situation:

(1) What is the status and intent of military and paramilitary forces?

(2) Who are the relevant governmental and nongovernmental actors in the operational area? What are their objectives? Are their objectives at odds or compatible with our (MAGTF/JTF) objectives?

(3) What resources exist locally (e.g., government, private sector, and resources that can be procured or rehabilitated)?

(4) Who are the key communicators (persons who hold the ear of the populace, e.g., mayors, village elders, religious leaders, teachers) within the operational area?

(5) What is the status of essential public services (water, electricity, communication, sanitation, transportation, including road, rail, bridge, and seaport and airport conditions and capabilities)? How does the current status compare to predisaster status?

(6) What is the status of health care providers, firefighters, police and court systems: Include availability, level of expertise (skilled laborers), equipment, and supplies.

(7) What relief agencies are in place, what are their roles and capabilities, and what resources do they have?

(8) What is the physical condition of the civilian populace?

(9) Where are the locations of medical facilities; what are their capabilities (e.g., diagnostic, ancillary, surgery, obstetrics, neonatal); are they operational, and to what level?

(10) What humanitarian needs are established (human suffering, disease, hunger, privation)? What activities are needed to directly address them? What supporting activities and functions are required?

(11) What facilities and support are available to forces from the affected country?

(12) What unique social, ethnic, or religious concerns affect the conduct of the operation?

(13) What are the legal limitations and funding restrictions to U.S. assistance in this particular instance?

(14) What is the local population's attitude toward who or what is causing their plight?

(15) What is the local populace's attitude towards the presence of U.S. forces?

(16) What are the force requirements to protect the force?

(17) What is the status of the HN strategic transportation infrastructure? Are available seaports and airfields in usable condition? What is the status of material handling equipment? Are local companies available to provide contracted labor and equipment?

4. **THE MILITARY ROLE IN FHA (OSLO GUIDELINES)**. The aim of *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence assets in Disaster Relief-Oslo Guidelines* is to establish the basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in international disaster relief operations.

a. The USG participated in the development of the guidelines and endorsed their use. However, they are not binding. The USG recognizes that the *Oslo Guidelines* outline the process for making military of civil-military requests through UNOCHA. NATO military forces may be requested to assist in disaster relief in accordance with the *Oslo Guidelines.*

b. The *Oslo Guidelines* provide that foreign military assets should be requested only when there is no comparable civilian alternative and only when the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, must be unique in capability and availability. Military assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms to provide specific support to specific requirements in response to the acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster needs and the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. For example, an amphibious ready group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) can produce over 300,000 gallons of fresh water daily and/or U.S. Navy ships produce electricity which can power urban areas.

c. **Categories Of Assistance**. For the purpose of the *Oslo Guidelines,* HADR missions can be divided into three categories based on the degree of contact with the affected population. These categories are important because they help define which types of humanitarian activities might be appropriate to support with international military resources, given that ample consultation has been conducted will all concerned parties to explain the nature and necessity of the assistance. Where practicable, the military role should focus on providing indirect and infrastructure support while minimizing direct assistance. The three categories are:

(1) Direct assistance. The face-to-face distribution of goods and services.

(2) Indirect assistance. This involves such activities as transporting relief goods or relief personnel and other activities that are at least one step removed from the population.

(3) Infrastructure support. This involves providing general services such as road repair, airspace management, and power generation that facilitate relief, but are not necessarily visible or solely for the benefit of the affected population.

5. **SOURCES OF INFORMATION**. Intelligence estimates, area assessments, surveys, and civil reconnaissance provide information on the situation in the crisis area, providing political, cultural, economic, military, geographic, and topographic, climatic, infrastructure and engineering, health, and other essential information. Other sources for an initial assessment include the U.S. country team, Combatant Commander (CCDR) country books, recent OFDA reports, UN assessments

(http://reliefweb.int), Pacific Disaster Center's Asia Pacific Natural Hazards and Vulnerabilities Atlas (http://atlas.pdc.org), MARCIMS, NGOs already operating in the area, and social media.



5. **SERVICE CAPABILITIES FOR FHA**

a. **Maritime Forces.** Maritime forces can provide operational maneuver and assured access while significantly reducing the footprint ashore and minimizing permissions from the HN.

(1) Forward deployed amphibious forces can provide immediate national response in support of and natural disaster relief operations. The MEU is the Marine Corps' lightest and most expeditionary version of the MAGTF. Embarked aboard a Navy ARG, the ARG/MEU provides the CCDR or other operational commander a quick, sea-based reaction force for a wide variety of missions including FHA. In response to HADR, the ARG/MEU provides capabilities to provide the following: MISO, FHA, SCA, CIM, NA, and PRC to include the two PRC sub categories of dislocated civilian operations, and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

(2) U.S. Navy ships can provide a safe and accessible location for the JTF HQ, provide seabasing for the joint force,

and have a limited ability to produce and distribute electrical power and clean water. Large deck amphibious ships are particularly useful to HADR operations, as they can support both helicopters and small vessels that can move supplies and equipment to shore. These vessels also have organic medical support, command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities, and berthing and messing facilities that may be available to a limited number of responders. Coastal riverine forces, expeditionary training teams, hospital ships, expeditionary medical facilities (EMFs), and forward-deployable preventative medicine units (FDPMUs) are other U.S. Navy assets that can be tailored to support FHA missions. Navy Expeditionary Logistics Support Group (NAVELSG) forces have supported numerous FHA operations in the past. NAVELSG forces can be utilized to offload cargo from maritime pre-position force (MPF) vessels or support air cargo operations at airfields.

(3) Military Sealift Command is a strategic power-projection capability that combines the lift capacity, flexibility, and responsiveness of surface ships with the speed of strategic airlift. Offloaded supplies are linked up with Marines and Navy Seabees arriving at nearby airfields. MPF is especially responsive to regional crises that involve HADR. These ships also have the capability to purify water and transfer it ashore.

(4) Reopening ports and resuming operations can be critical for sustained relief operations. Natural disasters-heavy weather events and earthquakes-can hamper safe navigation into both sea and aerial ports. Each service has expertise in conducting emergency port opening surveys and assessments.

b. **Air Forces**

(1) Airlift is an important method of moving relief supplies and rapidly moving personnel such as hospitals and water purification units to support FHA operations.

(2) Airfields can quickly become overwhelmed with aircraft transporting relief supplies. Aviation command and control (C2) elements, air traffic control elements, and aerial port units can facilitate the effective movement of supplies transported by aircraft. Civil engineer units have the capability to repair damaged airfields rapidly.

(3) In addition to the major functions of airlift and airfield development, air forces may also support FHA through airspace control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

(4) Helicopters have become a critical asset during FHA operations. When roads, bridges, and railroads have been damaged by a disaster, helicopters may be the only method to deliver relief supplies and transport relief workers in the affected area.

c. **Ground Forces**. Ground forces can provide surface transportation, engineering capabilities, supply, distribution, camp support, material handling, protection of relief workers and victims, health services, and MISO.

REFERENCES:

JP 3-29 *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*

Notes: